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During the last ten years corruption has drawn increasing attention from 
academicians and politicians. They studied the origins and consequences of 
corruption and tried to devise methods to discourage it. A vast literature 
developed and recent contributions were made by Susan Rose-Ackermann 
(1978, 1997, 1999), Arvind Jain (1998), Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny 
(1993), Vito Tanzi (1994,1998), Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi (1997), Simon 
Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón (1998a, 1998b), Daniel 
Kaufmann and Jeffrey Sachs (1998). 
Corruption is a special kind of crime. This paper applies standard 
microeconomic tools to examine the effects of corruption on the allocation of 
resources. 
First, corruption as a crime will be defined and then the framework used to 
analyze the symmetric “tragedies” of the commons and the anti-commons 
1 will 
be recalled in order to apply it to the study of corruption. At the end of the paper 




Corruption is a crime characterized by the use by an agent of a third 
party’s resources for his own advantage. 2 
Economists have devoted their attention to corruption since they 
persuaded themselves that bribes paid to corrupt agents were not mere 
redistributions of wealth without further effects on the allocation of resources. 
3 
But the canonical model used to study criminal behavior does not focus the 
analysis on the effect of crime on resources allocation but on the way to 
discourage crime. As Gary Becker 
4 pointed out in his Nobel Lecture: “I was late 
and had to decide quickly whether to put the car in a parking lot or risk getting a 
ticket for parking illegally on the street. I calculated the likelihood of getting a 
ticket, the size of the penalty, and the cost of putting the car in a lot. I decided it 
paid to take the risk and park the car on the street… As I walked…it occurred to 
me that the city authorities had probably gone through a similar analysis. The 
frequency of t heir inspection of parked vehicles and the size of the penalty 
imposed on violators should depend on their estimates of the type of calculations 
potential violators like me would make.” The point is quite clear: criminal behavior 
involves economic considerations in the evaluation of the trade-off between 
                                                  
1 See James M. Buchanam and Yong J. Yoon (2000) 
2 Andrei Schleifer and Robert Vischny (1993) define corruption as the use of public property to get private 
benefits. This definition excludes corruption among  private agents as is presented for example in  Federico 
Weinschelbaum (1998). 
3 See Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella (1997) for a survey. 
4 Becker (1993), pp. 389-390.  
2 
expected benefits and costs. So, the way society chooses to improve the working 
of institutions to discourage crime should recognize such a rational reasoning 
and when solving the problem directed to minimize the damage caused by 
criminal activity plus the level of resources devoted to deterrence detailed 
attention is paid to the choice of optimum levels of punishment and enforcement 
to produce deterrence by reducing expected benefits and increasing expected 
costs of criminal activity. The analysis usually assumes that the utility derived 
from criminal activity is given and does not depend on institutions devised to 
discourage crime. 
5  
Corruption is a criminal activity and can be analyzed within the general 
model outlined above but the particular point that will be stressed in this paper is 
that utility (or benefits) derived from corrupt behavior depends on institutions 
devised to discourage it. So, the study of the symmetric “tragedies” of the 
commons and the anti-commons which stresses the link between the allocation 
of property rights and the efficient utilization of resources appears as a useful 
scheme to analyze the effects of corruption on the efficiency of resources 
allocation and to suggest institutional policies to discourage it.  
Perfect property rights concede one and only one agent the right to use 
and the right to exclude other agents from the use of a valuable resource. 
Imperfect property rights that concede multiple agents the right to use a resource 
result in a “tragedy of the commons” while imperfect property rights that concede 
multiple agents the right to exclude others from the use of a resource result in a 
“tragedy of the anti-commons”. Both “tragedies” imply an inefficient utilization of a 
valuable resource: the “tragedy of the commons” results in an over-utilization of 
the resource while the “tragedy of the anti-commons” results in an under-
utilization of the valuable resource.  
The framework to analyze the “tragedy of the commons” was suggested 
by Garret Hardin (1968) and it will be used here to study first the case of perfect 
property rights endowed upon one agent and then the cases of no agent 
endowed with exclusion rights and multiple agents endowed with exclusion 
rights. 
Let us think about a field used to feed cows. Cows produce milk and 
cows` average productivity, measured as a flow of liters per unit of time, declines 
as the number of cows fed in the field increases. One agent is the sole owner of 
the field (he is endowed with perfect property rights) and must decide how many 
cows to feed there. His target is to maximize benefits measured in total liters of 
milk per unit of time (or in money for a constant price of milk). To get maximum 
benefits marginal revenues and marginal costs must be equated and, if it is 
assumed that there are no costs associated with the feeding of cows, the 
optimum number of cows to be fed in the field is the one that makes marginal 
revenue equal to zero. It is the monopoly solution with no production costs. The 
function linking cows` average productivity with the number of cows fed in the 
field plays the rôle of a demand curve. For the simple case of a linear average 
                                                  
5 Expected utility depends on institutions but utility derived from criminal activity does not since the 
former does depend on the probability of crime success which is a function of the level of deterrence while 
the latter does not. See Javier Estrada (1994).  
3 
productivity function  bx a p - =  with  p  measuring average productivity, x the 












c =  is the competitive solution which is equal to the saturation number of 
cows.  These solutions are shown in Figure 1. It must be pointed out that 
* x  is 
the efficient solution: the number of cows that maximizes social revenue. 
To illustrate “the tragedy of the commons”, let us assume that there are 
two agents and no one has exclusion rights. It implies that both of them may use 
the feeding field. The field is now a common property (a “common”). Each agent 
must decide how many cows to feed there in order to maximize his own benefit. 
Nothing has changed but the way property rights are defined. The analogy is now 
with Cournot`s duopoly (again, without production costs or strictly Cournot). Each 





 cows (the Cournot-Nash solution). 





2 ˆ =  cows fed in the field as is also shown in Figure 1.  An 
immediate generalization suggests that when the field is used as a true 
“common” (as in the Middle Ages) and there are n agents the number of cows 










c =  as  n tends to infinity. In this case the 
wealth society draws from the use of the field is dissipated. The “tragedy of the 
commons” is the overuse of the valuable resource. 
A symmetric case appears under the label “tragedy of the anti-commons”.
6 
The same technological conditions assumed  to present the “tragedy of the 
commons” apply in this case but multiple agents are endowed with the right too 
exclude others from the use of the valuable resource. Each agent must set the 
price each cow should paid to him to enter the feeding field. In order to enter the 
field, a cow must pay the sum of the prices set by each agent. Let us assume 
there are two excluding agents.  One of them sells a red ticket and the other a 
blue one. To enter the field a cow (the owner of a cow) must buy both tickets so 
the price to introduce a cow into the field is p: the sum of the price of a red ticket 
                                                  
6 The name is due to Michael Heller (1998) who also applied it to patent analysis in Michael Heller and 
Rebecca Eisenberg (1998).  
4 
p1 plus the price of a blue ticket p2. The reserve price the owner of a cow is 
willing to pay to enter the field is its average productivity and so  bx a p - =  in 
Figure 1 is now a demand curve showing the reserve price as a function of the 
total number of cows being fed in the field. Each excluding agent sets his price p1  
or p2 to maximize his own revenue (remember that costs are assumed to be 
zero). Again, the analogy is with Cournot`s duopoly but, in a symmetric way to 
the “commons” analysis, the control variable is not quantity but price: one agent 





- =  
determines the number of cows fed in the field. The price  a p =
0  is the symmetric 




c = . The Cournot-Nash solution is  a p p
3
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=  is the number of cows fed in the field. When 




 and the number of 






. When n tends to infinity then the price tends to a 
and the number of cows tends to zero. No wealth is drawn by society from the 
use of the field (in fact the field is not used at all). The “tragedy of the anti-
commons” is the under-utilization of the valuable resource. 
 
II 
A corrupt agent uses a third party’s resource for his own advantage or 
benefit. To do so the corrupt agent supplies a good which is not his although he 
has exclusion rights on such a good. Those exclusion rights were given to him by 
delegation by the owner of the good. Examples of goods supplied by potentially 
corrupt agents are passports, driving licenses, important export licenses, licenses 
to exploit oil fields, access to industrial promotion regimes, rights to sell inputs to 
a firm, manufacturing franchises for a good and so on. 
There is a demand curve for the good supplied by the potentially corrupt agent. 
The simplest case is that in which the demand curve is linear as in Figure 1. The  
5 
demand curve  bx a p - =  shows the reserve prices consumers are willing to pay 
to the corrupt agent who supplies each unit of the good. The analysis of the 
symmetric “tragedies” of the commons and the anti-commons can be applied to 





c = . Price and marginal cost are equal for this quantity: 
c x  is the efficient 
Pareto solution and this is also the “tragedy of the commons” solution with a 
number of agents that tends to infinity. Quantity 
c x  is the supply society will 
choose and the good will be a free good as it should be the case for the 
examples of passports, driving licenses, import and export licenses, licenses to 
exploit oil fields, access to industrial promotion regimes, rights to sell inputs to a 
firm,  manufacturing franchises for a good and so on. But, if there is just one 







*  to get a bribe 
equal to  a
2
1
 as is shown in Figure 1. Corruption implies that the good is under-
supplied or the valuable resource under-utilized. The result is even worst if there 
are  n corrupt agents endowed with exclusion rights. The case is easy to 
understand thinking about the different conditions required to get a driving 
license: a  physical exam must be passed, then a psychological exam must be 
passed, then a theoretical exam must be passed, then a driving exam must be 
passed, then … Each requirement is administered by a different agent. Each one 
of them has exclusion rights: all requisites must be fulfilled to get the good. Each 
corrupt agent is able to charge a bribe: a red ticket and a blue ticket and … must 
be paid to get the good. It is the “tragedy of the anti-commons” case. If there are 
n corrupt agents and each of them charges an independent bribe, the price for 















 units supplied. Price goes up as the number of requisites 
grows. In the limit, when  n (the number of requisites administered by different 
corrupt agents) tends to infinity the good is not supplied. 
  The structure of the analyses presented follows Cournot`s oligopoly study. 
Equilibrium solutions for both “tragedies”  –commons and anti-commons- are 
Cournot-Nash solutions and both problems can be worked out as n persons 
games as it is done in the Appendix. Although it is important to point-out that the 
Pareto efficiency characteristics of solutions is totally different when the analysis 
is applied to study oligopoly behavior and when it is used to examine the 
symmetric “tragedies” of the commons and the anti-commons. In the case of an 
oligopolistic market the efficient solution is reached with a large number of 
suppliers (n should tend to infinity) so that competition maximizes consumers` 
surplus and monopoly rents are reduced to zero. In the “tragedies” analysis the 
efficient use of a valuable resource implies that rents derived from it should be 
maximized and competition among agents endowed only with rights to use in the  
6 
“commons” case and exclusion rights in the “anti-commons” case dissipates 
rents with no redistribution to consumers. When the “tragedies” analysis is 
applied to the study of corruption the efficiency characteristics of solutions come 
back to the oligopoly case with a Pareto efficient solution for a large number of 
users (n tends to infinity) and no exclusion rights (the “commons” solution) and 
dissipation of rents with no production (the “anti-commons” solution) for a large 
number of excluders (n tends to infinity) and no user. In the “commons” case 
consumers` surplus is maximized and no corruption bribes are charged; in the 
“anti-commons” case, corrupt agents capture a part of consumers` surplus 





  Three main conclusions about the effects of corruption on the allocation of 
resources can be drawn from the analysis performed. The first conclusion is 
about corruption punishment. The second conclusion is about organized crime or 
“maffia” behavior. The third conclusion is about institutions devised to avoid 
corruption. 
  The traditional economic analysis of crime points out that expected 
punishment is the price (or cost) of criminal activity. So, increased punishment 
should reduce criminal activity through increasing costs. But the analysis 
presented in section II shows that to increase punishment implies to increase the 
marginal cost for each corrupt agent so that this is no longer zero but positive. 
Efficient allocation of resources still requires to equate demand to zero because 
marginal production costs are null. Each corrupt agent trying to maximize 
benefits will set a higher bribe than the one he set when expected punishment 
implied a zero marginal cost and quantity supplied (the use of the valuable 
resource for society) will depart even more than before from the Pareto efficient 
solution. The only exception to this result follows when expected cost is higher 
than the maximum reserve price society is willing to pay. In this improbable case 
corruption is discouraged. This is an improbable case because expected cost of 
punishment is the product of a probability with a very low value for this kind of 
crime, multiplied by a fine which cannot be extremely high in order to be credible. 
  The analysis of the “tragedy of the anti-commons” presented in section II 
showed that as the number of corrupt agents increases the use of the valuable 
resource decreases departing more and more from the Pareto-efficient solution. 
This implies that when the number of corrupt agents is one the departure from 
the efficient solution is minimum. Many different corrupt agents behaving under a 
collusion agreement (a “maffia” agreement) will produce a better use of the 
valuable resource for society than the one resulting from each one acting as an 
isolate decision-making unit. 
  The analysis presented in section II shows that when there are multiple 
exclusion rights the effects of corruption on the allocation of a valuable resource 
may be avoided turning a “tragedy of the anti-commons” solution into a “tragedy 
of the commons” solution. Society should build institutions to achieve this  
7 
objective. Institutions that favor competition among potentially corrupt agents 
work in the right direction: it is clear that many agents endowed with the power of 
supplying the same good will end up using the valuable resource up to the point 
in which marginal cost is equal to demand. It should be stressed that this is a 
case in which many agents can supply the same good and each one of them 
“sells” the whole set of requirements needed to get each unit of the good as 
opposed to the case of multiple agents with exclusion rights on the same unit of 
the good. 
  To sum-up: first, punishment of corruption may result in a worst allocation 
of a valuable resource than no punishment at all; second, organized crime 
produces a better allocation than disorganized crime and third, competition 
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In this appendix a proof is provided to show that with no exclusion rights 
and agents responding only to private incentives a valuable resource is over-
utilized while multiple exclusion rights results in under-utilization of the same 
resource. 
Consider n agents, each of them supplies units of a good so that the total 
number of units offered is 
n x x x + + = ... 1           (1) 
   where  i x  is the quantity supplied by agent i. Production costs are zero. The 
benefit of supplying a unit when x units are supplied is 
  ( ) x p p =             (2) 
Function (2) is such that 
   
( ) 0 max æ = x p p  for  max x xÆ   but   ( ) 0 = x p   for   max x x ‡   (3) 
and 
for   max x xÆ ,    ( ) 0 Æ ¢ x p   and   ( ) 0 Æ ¢ ¢ x p                           (4) 
  When there are no exclusion rights agents simultaneously choose how 
many units to supply. Assume the good is continuously divisible. A strategy for 
agent  i is the choice of  i x . Assuming that the strategy space is  [ ) ¥ , 0  which 
covers all the choices that could possibly be of interest to the agent, the pay off 
(benefit) to agent i  from supplying x units when the quantities supplied by the 
other agents are  ( ) n i i x x x x ..., , , ..., , 1 1 1 + -  is 
  ( ) i n i i i x x x x x p R ..., , , ..., , 1 1 1 + - =                                (5) 
Thus, if  ( )
c
n
c x x ..., , 1  is to be a Nash equilibrium then 
c
i x  must maximize (5) given 







c x x x x , .... , , ..., , 1 1 1 + - . The first-order condition for 
this optimization problem is  
















i x x x x x p x x x x x x p        (6) 
Substituting 
c
i x  into (6), summing over all  n agents’ first-order conditions and 
then dividing by n yields 
( ) ( ) 0
1
= ¢ +
c c c x p x
n












=   for the linear case presented 
in the main text. 
The “maffia” solution 
* x  solves 
( )x x p R
x =
¥ £ £ 0 max           (8) 
and the first-order condition is 
( ) ( ) 0 = ¢ +









*  for the linear case presented in the main text. 
  When there are multiple exclusion rights and n agents they simultaneously 
choose  i p  to maximize 
  ( ) n i i i i p p p p x p R , ,... , , ... , 1 1 1 + - = ¢       (10) 
Thus, if  ( )
e
n
e p p , ... , 1   is to be a Nash equilibrium then 
e
i p   must maximize (10) given 







e p p p p ...., , , , ... , 1 1 1 + - .  Getting the first-order 
condition for this problem, summing over all n agents` first-order conditions and 
then dividing by n yields 
  ( ) ( ) 0 `
1
= +
e e e p x p
n










=   for the linear case presented 
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